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It took me a while, and required the reluctant admission that foraging in old vinyl record shops was 
not as efficient as a quick search on the internet, but I now possess Ian Gillan’s original 
performance as Jesus in the Lloyd Webber-Rice concept album of Jesus Christ Superstar. What 
that has to do with Hegel and his views of political philosophy and science may well be rather 
obscure, but I shall endeavour to make it clear in the denouement to this review. 
 
The manuscript of Hegel’s Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science is the record of 
the first delivery of his mature thinking on the philosophy of right and the first time he had returned 
to the subject of political philosophy after the earlier Jena period where he composed the critique of 
both empirical and Kantian versions of natural law (1802) and shortly afterward the System of 
Ethical Life (1803-04). The lectures were delivered at Heidelberg in 1817-1818 and comments and 
additions were added from both academic years. The volume also contains the introduction from 
his first Berlin lectures (1818-1819) on the same subject in the succeeding year and two years 
before he chose to publish a set of student notes for the academic year 1821 which constitute the 
canonical version of the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Students in his Heidelberg lectures 
were still working from the objective mind section of the third volume of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia 
(1816 version). The text is composed of dictated passages and reconstructed extrapolations from 
the transcripts of the law student Peter Wannenmann. The notes share the form of other versions of 
Hegel’s lectures: a lecture note paragraph, a remark which is usually a transcription of Hegel’s 
dictated own words and then an addition which is the student’s recollection of Hegel’s exposition 
of the paragraph in question. The manuscript was found by chance in an antiquarian bookshop in 
Heidelberg in the 1950s. 
 
The edition itself is a faithful and reliable translation with commentary as is necessary and a 
useful glossary of the most common Hegelian terms of art and their preferred translations. Otto 
Pöggeler’s informative and excellent editorial introduction situates the lectures nicely in both an 
historical and biographical context, paying very careful attention to the role contemporary debates 
in the politics of Prussia and beyond played in influencing the content of the lectures. In many 
respects, Pöggeler sees Hegel’s overriding motivation as a need to describe the emergence of a new 
Europe from the ruins of the old. The publication of Hegel’s earlier Phenomenology of Spirit 
coincided with the fall of Europe to Napoleon, whereas, just over ten years later in 1818, Europe 
has to respond to the reorganization instigated by the Congress of Vienna. There is a strong flavour 
of the revolutionary and Napoleonic ideals of dismantling inherited and undeserved privilege, but 
at the same time, an implicit drive to avoid the return to the flames of revolutionary change. 
  
The content of Hegel’s lectures span the more common disciplines of moral philosophy, 
political science, economics and political philosophy, what he refers to as the spheres of right. 
Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of right are consistently similar in structure throughout his 
career and seek to demonstrate that the modern state is the most rational institutional form to  
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separate the independence of the subjective will as an individual element of subjective freedom and 
simultaneously reconcile it with the burdens, benefits and liberations that cooperative, social life 
makes possible, one of which is the very independence and dignity of the will itself.  The source 
and origin of “natural right” (later replaced by “the philosophical doctrine of right” which is here 
explained) is the thinking of “will in its free self-determination.” (§1) Hegel is constantly at pains 
to avoid the Scylla of modern atomistic subjectivism in moral thinking and the Charybdis of falling 
back into an unreflective quietism. For him, the institutional structure of modern society (the 
family, civil society and the political state proper), its understandings and historical mores, coupled 
with its subjective understanding of individuals is by far the most rational form of social 
organization. And by rational Hegel means neither reactionary, in the sense of unreflectively 
conforming to social norms, nor transcendental, in the sense that an individual can access some sort 
of ahistorical, privileged position from which to determine what is right and good. 
 
The reason for interest in the early version of Hegel’s lectures on right is obvious for most 
scholars. One pressing question in recent interpretations of Hegel’s political writings is their 
compatibility with liberal views. After all, there are always elements of an historical thinker to 
which we feel drawn or, perhaps, wish to reconstruct, but do so knowing that other elements of that 
thinker's position often attach themselves like barnacles and no amount of scrubbing will make 
them fall. Many of those who have seen an immanent liberalism hidden behind the metaphysical 
smokescreen of Hegel’s political position would claim that the smokescreen was being employed 
to fool the Prussian censors, just as prefaces, introductions and conclusions are more conservative 
than the text as a whole (because censors notoriously read only the beginnings and ends of books 
and skip the middle or difficult bits). Private Hegel, it would be argued, was more liberal than 
Public Figure Hegel with whom the philosopher had to be consistent in his published writings. So, 
a collection of lecture notes which were transcribed from the event of lecturing, free of an 
introductory preface, owls, cows and so on, would apparently be indispensable for establishing the 
validity of such an interpretation. Since there is no evidence of an editorial need from Hegel 
himself to mould his ideas in line with an expected Prussian censor, the scholar seemingly has 
access to a text in which Hegel engages more straightforwardly with political philosophy, concerns 
of poverty, justice and the structure of the state. For those who believe his private views were to the 
left of his public views in his state-approved publications, the present text should provide some 
support.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no real evidence here to support wholeheartedly such a claim, 
although many interesting minor nuances do come to the fore. Discussions on the nature of civil 
society and the Prussian constitutional form are more reflective and critical, the content is often 
more direct and the expression clearer than the official versions of the notes. Moreover, it is the 
case that the conservative aspect to his thought is downplayed in favour of the need to rationalize 
the contemporary social and material conditions of Europe (not just Germany), its institutions and 
mores. Nowhere is this more stark than in the textual position and expression of his famous 
aphorism from the Preface of the 1821 lectures (“What is rational is actual; what is actual is 
rational”). Here, it is embedded in the context of a debate about the origin of the state in historical 
development and explicitly critical: “what is rational must happen.” (§134) The nuances in Hegel’s 
earlier lectures are interesting: he is at pains to stress the difference between his concept of 
objective spirit and the more traditional, and no doubt intuitive for his students, concept of natural 
law (perhaps because Hegel returned to the subject of political philosophy by reacquainting himself 
with his own work on Natural Law in in his earlier career); and the clearer elaboration of the  
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distinction between rationality and actuality is useful. Neither of these, though, would instigate any 
significant shift in the interpretative debates.  
 
And that brings me back to the Deep Purple frontman’s performance as Jesus. When I first 
learnt he had performed as the original Jesus on the vinyl album, I was struck by the question 
how his personal vocal style may well have defined the role or vice versa. These are questions 
which are only of interest to a Deep Purple nerd. The main audience for yet another earlier 
version of Hegel’s system of right may well be just Hegel nerds, collecting another set of lecture 
notes in order to measure the slight developments of his thought. I would argue that the 1818 
lectures deserve a little more attention than only from that quarter, not least because of the clarity 
of expression. But I am, of course, a Hegel nerd.  
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